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Abstract
In this paper, we address the problem of service availability in mobile ad-hoc WANs.
We present a secure mechanism to stimulate end users to keep their devices turned on, to
refrain from overloading the network, and to thwart tampering aimed at converting the
device into a \selsh" one. Our solution is based on the application of a tamper resistant
security module in each device and cryptographic protection of messages.
1 Introduction
1.1 The context
The Terminodes Project [1, 2] is a 10-year research program (2000-2010) with the aim to
investigate wide area, large, totally wireless, mobile networks that we call mobile ad-hoc
wide area networks. In this project, we follow a radically distributed approach, in which
all networking functions are embedded in the terminals themselves. Because they act as
network nodes and terminals at the same time, we call these devices terminodes. A network
of terminodes is an autonomous, self-organized network, completely independent of any xed
infrastructure or other equipment.
Our vision of the Terminodes Project can be illustrated by a free, amateur, wireless ad-
hoc network covering a wide area, which operates at unlicensed frequencies. In this scenario,
terminodes are small personal devices that everyone in the area could potentially own. The
size of the network can reach several million devices in regions of high density population.
Communication among users is based on packet switched
1
, multi-hop, wireless communication
of voice and data. An important characteristic of terminode networks is that there are no
routing tables stored in the devices. Instead, a simple packet forwarding mechanism lets each
of the terminodes located on the route of a given packet compute the \best" next hop toward
the nal destination [3].

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While circuit switching is an advantage for supporting voice, the complexity associated with establishing,
maintaining, and releasing circuits, or any form of connection, is at odds with the requirement that intermediate
systems are user equipment, and may operate quite irregularly.
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1.2 The problem
The problem that we address in this paper is the availability of services in terminode net-
works. In civilian applications of ad-hoc networks, which we are exclusively concerned with
in the Terminodes Project, availability is often considered to be the security issue of greatest
relevance for users [4]. We concentrate on two aspects of availability in terminode networks:
 Stimulation for co-operation. Since all networking services (e.g., packet forwarding,
mobility management) should be provided by the terminodes themselves, these services
are available only if the terminodes (or, more precisely, their users) are willing to pro-
vide them. On the other hand, service provision is not in the direct interest of users,
because it consumes energy and thus, reduces battery lifetime. Therefore, a stimulation
mechanism that encourages users to leave their terminodes switched on and let them
provide services to other terminodes is required.
One can say that being able to receive messages is enough motivation for the user to
leave her terminode switched on. While this may indeed be true, it is certainly not
enough to encourage users to provide services to other terminodes. The hardware and
the software of the terminode can be tampered with and their behavior can be modied
by the user in a way that the device can receive messages but it does not provide
any services to the community. Furthermore, criminal organizations can tamper with
terminodes and sell corrupted devices, which do not co-operate in order to save energy,
on a large scale.
So far, civilian applications of ad-hoc networks have been envisioned mainly in crisis
situations (e.g., rescue operations). For this reason, it was assumed that users are
naturally motivated to co-operate. In terminode networks, this assumption does not
hold, because of the size of the network, and because we consider that the network
lifetime can be long (typically, several years).
 Prevention of overloading. Often, services are unavailable because the network is
overloaded and it can no longer carry useful information. The network can become
overloaded because of a malicious denial-of-service attack, or simply because some of
the (otherwise legitimate) users want to send too much information. Therefore, we
need a mechanism that makes denial-of-service attacks \expensive" and discourages
users from ooding the network with useless trac. In cellular networks, this objective
is automatically achieved by charging the users.
1.3 The approach
One possible approach to stimulate a co-operative behavior and prevent congestion is to
introduce the concept of money and service charges. The natural idea is that terminodes
that used a service should be charged and terminodes that provided a service should be
remunerated. To this end, we introduce a terminode currency that we call beans. We assume
that the terminode hardware comes with an initial stock of beans. The terminode beans have
no monetary value, and they can only be used within terminode networks.
Now, if a terminode wants to use a service (e.g., wants to send a message), then it has to
pay for it in beans. This motivates each terminode to increase its number of beans, because
beans are indispensable for using the network. Thus, the terminode is no longer interested in
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sending useless messages and overloading the network because this would decrease its number
of beans, and it is better o providing services to other terminodes because this is the only
way to earn beans
2
.
1.4 Outline
In the sequel, we focus on the rewarding of one of the most important services that the ter-
minodes should provide to each other, namely, packet forwarding. In Section 2, we introduce
two approaches to solve this problem: the Packet Purse Model and the Packet Trade Model.
The remaining sections are concerned with the implementation of these models. In Section 3,
we summarize our general assumptions. Then, we present implementations that enforce the
models in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5, we discuss the robustness and the eciency of our
solution, and, in Section 6, we conclude the paper.
2 Rewarding the packet forwarding service
2.1 The Packet Purse Model (PPM)
In this model, the originator of the packet pays for the packet forwarding service. The service
charge is distributed among the forwarding terminodes in the following way: When sending
the packet, the originator loads it with a number of beans sucient to reach the destination.
Each forwarding terminode acquires one or several beans from the packet and thus, increases
the stock of its beans; the number of beans depends on the direct connection on which the
packet is forwarded (long distance requires more beans). If a packet does not have enough
beans to be forwarded, then it is discarded.
Packet forwarding in the Packet Purse Model is illustrated in Figure 1. Let us assume
that originally each terminode has 7 beans (1). Furthermore, let us assume that A wants to
send a packet to D. In order to do so, A loads, say, 5 beans in the packet and sends it to
the next hop B (2). B takes out 1 bean from the packet, and forwards it with the remaining
4 beans to C (3). C takes out 2 beans from the packet and forwards it with the remaining
2 beans to the nal destination D (4). Note that terminodes B and C, which forwarded the
packet, increased their stock of beans, whereas terminode A, which originated the packet,
decreased its stock of beans.
The basic problem with this approach is that it might be dicult to estimate the number
of beans that are required to reach a given destination. If the originator under-estimates
this number, then the packet will be discarded, and the originator loses its investment in
this packet. If the originator over-estimates the number (like in our example above), then
the packet will arrive, but the originator still loses the remaining beans in the packet
3
. The
model described in the next subsection overcomes this problem.
2
Similar to money in real life, beans can be lost as well. This loss has to be compensated somehow, otherwise
the system gets poorer and poorer. One way to solve this problem is to let users buy beans. This would mean
that providing services is, actually, not the only way to earn beans. However, it can be made the preferred
way by appropriately choosing the price of one bean.
3
Although, if the destination of the packet is a terminode that provides information services, then the
remaining beans can be used to pay for these.
3
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Figure 1: The Packet Purse Model
2.2 The Packet Trade Model (PTM)
In this approach, the packet does not carry beans, but it is traded for beans by intermediate
terminodes. Each intermediary \buys" it from the previous one for some beans
4
, and \sells"
it to the next one (or to the destination) for more beans. In this way, each intermediary that
provided a service by forwarding the packet, increases its number of beans, and the total cost
of forwarding the packet is covered by the destination of the packet.
As an example, let us consider Figure 2. Let us assume that originally each terminode
has 7 beans (1). Furthermore, let us assume that A wants to send a packet to D. A sends
the packet to the rst hop B for free (2). B then sells it to the next hop C for 1 bean (3).
Finally, C sells it to the nal destination D for 2 beans (4). Note that terminodes B and
C, which forwarded the packet, increased their number of beans, whereas the destination D
decreased its number of beans.
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Figure 2: The Packet Trade Model
An advantage of this approach is that the originator does not have to know in advance
the number of beans required to deliver a packet. Furthermore, letting the destination pay
for the packet forwarding makes this approach applicable in case of multicast packets as well.
A disadvantage is that this approach for charging does not directly deter users from
ooding the network. However, allowing each terminode to decide if it buys a packet or not
can provide a sort of \back pressure" mechanism, which may deter a user from generating
4
Except for the rst intermediary that receives the packet for free from the originator.
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too much trac, by ensuring that eventually nobody will buy packets from users who try to
overload the network.
2.3 Problems to be solved
Clearly, the models described above must be enforced somehow, otherwise the terminodes
may depart from them. Terminodes (users) may misbehave in several ways if no enforcement
and no protection are applied. One important general problem is, for instance, to prevent
bean forgery.
In addition, the problems that we have to cope with in the Packet Purse Model include
the following:
 The originator of a packet should be denied the re-use of the beans that it loaded in
the packet purse.
 A forwarding terminode should be denied taking more beans out of the packet than it
deserves for the packet forwarding (i.e., \packet robbery" should be prevented).
 Each intermediary should be forced to indeed forward the packet after having taken the
beans out of it.
 The integrity of the packet purse should be protected during transit.
 The replay of a packet purse should be detected
5
.
 Detachment of a packet purse from its original packet and re-use of it with another
packet should be impossible.
Problems to be solved in the Packet Trade Model include the following:
 Each terminode should be denied the re-use of the beans that it spent for buying packets.
 A forwarding terminode should receive the beans from the next hop if, and only if, the
next hop receives the packet from the forwarding terminode (fairness of the exchange).
 An intermediary should be prevented from selling the same packet several times (pos-
sibly to dierent next hops).
Furthermore, all the problems above should be solved in an ecient way; forwarding a
single packet should not require complex cryptographic protocols and heavy computational
eort, because the cost of these may well exceed the value of the service. We believe that we
have found the best trade-o between robustness and eciency in our implementations of the
Packet Purse Model and the Packet Trade Model, which we present in the following sections.
5
Consider the following subtle replay attack. An intermediary receives a packet with a packet purse, it
copies them and then, simulates the reception of the same packet with the same packet purse several times
(each time increasing its stock of beans) without forwarding the packet. If this kind of replay was not detected,
then the intermediary can, actually, become arbitrarily rich from this single packet.
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3 General assumptions
In this section, we summarize our general assumptions, which our implementations of the
models described above rely on.
 Tamper resistant security module. We assume that each terminode has a tamper
resistant security module, such as, for instance, a special chip or a smart card, that is
used for the management of cryptographic parameters (e.g., keys) and beans. We assume
that this security module functions correctly and its behavior cannot be modied by the
user of the terminode or other attackers. Contrary to the security module, other parts of
the terminode hardware and software are not tamper resistant and their behavior can be
modied by anybody who has physical access to the device. We understand that regular
users usually do not have the required level of knowledge and skills to modify their
terminodes. Criminal organizations, however, can have enough interest and resources
to reverse engineer a terminode and sell tampered terminodes with modied behavior
on a large scale. Users may be interested in buying these tampered devices if they oer
advantages over correctly behaving ones (e.g., longer battery lifetime). Our design goal
is to distribute the terminode functions between the tamper resistant security module
and the rest of the terminode device, which can be altered by an attacker, in a way that
modication of the latter cannot give any advantages to the attacker.
 Public key infrastructure. We assume that there exists a public key infrastructure
that the terminodes (or, more precisely, their security modules) can use to authenticate
each other and to establish secure communication links. The design of an appropriate
public key infrastructure for terminodes is an interesting and non-trivial problem that
is beyond the scope of this paper. An approach to solve this problem is described in
[5], other possible approaches are mentioned in [3].
 Slow mobility. We assume that the terminodes move \slowly" compared to the amount
of trac that goes through them. This is not to say that the terminodes must be
physically slow, but that the neighborhood of a terminode does not change very fast.
This makes it feasible for the terminode to keep track of its neighbors by running a
sort of \hello protocol" at regular time intervals. Besides discovering its neighbors, the
security module of the terminode uses the hello protocol to establish shared secrets
with the security modules of its neighbors (dierent secrets with dierent neighbors, of
course). The establishment of the shared secret is based on public key cryptography
and relies on the existing public key infrastructure. In addition to the shared secret,
we require that the security module agrees on the initial values of two counters with
each of its neighbors. The shared secret and the two counters are used to protect the
communication between neighboring security modules and will be discussed further in
Section 4.
 Omnidirectional antennae. We assume that the terminodes use omnidirectional
antennae, which means that a message sent by a terminode can be heard by all the
terminodes within the communication range of the sender. We further assume that such
a message can not only be heard, but it is understood by all of the neighbors. By this,
we mean that all the neighbors receive the message and can determine who the sender
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and the intended receiver are and what the content of the message is
6
. Depending on
the MAC layer used, this may require that the terminodes agree on further parameters
with their neighbors during the hello protocol. If, for instance, access to the shared
radio resource is based on code division (CDMA), then the terminode should inform
its neighbors about all the codes that it uses, in order for the neighbors to be able to
receive messages sent by the terminode.
 Reliable communication between neighbors. For the sake of simplicity, we assume
that the communication between neighboring terminodes is reliable. This means that if
a message is sent successfully (e.g., without any collision), then it arrives to the intended
next hop correctly. We will address the problem of unreliable communication links in
a future paper. We note, however, that this assumption does not imply that end-to-
end communication is reliable. Since messages can be modied and intercepted by the
forwarding terminodes themselves, successfully sending a message to the next hop does
not mean that the message will correctly arrive to the nal destination.
 Pricing. In the Packet Purse Model, we assume that there exists a mechanism to
estimate the number of beans that the originator of a packet must load in the packet
purse in order for the packet to be delivered to the nal destination. Furthermore,
we also assume that there is a mechanism to determine the number of beans that a
forwarding terminode can acquire from a packet purse. Similarly, in the Packet Trade
Model, we assume that there exists a mechanism to determine the number of beans, for
which a forwarding terminode can sell a packet to the next hop.
In order to ease presentation, in this paper, we assume that each forwarding terminode
should be rewarded with exactly one bean for the packet forwarding. This means,
that in the Packet Purse Model, each intermediate terminode that forwards the packet
can take exactly one bean out of it, and in the Packet Trade Model, each forwarding
intermediary can sell the packet for one more bean than it paid for. Our solution,
however, works without modications in the general case as well.
 Terminodes are greedy. We assume that terminodes are greedy, and they always
want to increase their number of beans. On one hand, this is reasonable, because beans
are indispensable for using the network. On the other hand, there might be situations,
where greediness is not the best strategy. Consider, for instance, a terminode that has
a lot of beans, but whose battery is almost exhausted. In this situation, earning more
beans has clearly less benet, than saving battery power. But if the terminode is greedy,
then it keeps on forwarding packets, and uses up all of its energy. It would be more
realistic to assume that the behavior of the terminode depends on both the number of
its beans and the status of its battery. This issue is left for further study.
 No network operator. We assume that the network is totally self-organized and
self-operated. Users simply purchase terminodes and use them. The inter-working with
existing xed and wireless networks is left for future study.
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More precisely, each neighbor can see the bits of the message, although not necessarily understanding the
real meaning of the message (e.g., in case of end-to-end encrypted messages).
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4 Implementing the models
We use the tamper resistant security module to enforce the behavior described by the models.
In this section, we present the description of this module and the protocols that it runs with
its environment. Our leading design principle is to put as little as possible in the security
module in order to rely on as few assumptions as possible.
4.1 Long and medium term data in the security module
The security module stores and manipulates data that is critical for the correct behavior of
the system. Since the security module is tamper resistant, this data cannot be corrupted by
the user of the terminode or other attackers.
The following long term data are stored in the security module SM :
 Unique identier. The security module stores its system-wide unique identier, which
we denote by id
SM
.
 Private key. The security module has a public key and a corresponding private key.
The private key is exclusively known to SM and, thus, it must be stored by SM . The
public key does not need to be kept secret, therefore, it can be stored elsewhere. It is
important, however, that other security modules associate the right public key (i.e., the
public key of SM) with the unique identier of SM . This is ensured with the help of
the assumed public key infrastructure.
 Number of beans. Beans are represented by counters in the security modules of the
terminodes. The wealth of each terminode is equal to the value of the bean counter in
its security module. We denote the bean counter in the security module by b
SM
.
In addition, the security module keeps a list of current neighbors and maintains data
associated to each of these. SM stores the following medium term data for each neighboring
security module SM
0
:
 Unique identier. The system-wide unique identier id
SM
0
of the neighbor.
 Shared secret key. When SM and SM
0
become neighbors, they establish a shared
secret key k
SM;SM
0
between them using the hello protocol and public key cryptography.
This shared secret is exclusively known to SM and SM
0
, and it is used to protect
the communication between them. This protection, in turn, is based on symmetric
key cryptography for eciency reasons. Protection is necessary, because the security
modules cannot communicate directly but only through their hosting terminodes, which
are under the control of (potentially malicious) users.
 Sending and receiving counters. SM stores a sending counter n
SM!SM
0
and a
receiving counter n
SM SM
0
associated with SM
0
. These counters are used to detect
message replay, which, as mentioned in Subsection 2.3, would fool the security module
to process the same message twice. SM
0
has similar counters n
SM
0
!SM
and n
SM
0
 SM
,
which are associated with SM . When SM and SM
0
become neighbors, they initialize
their receiving counters to random values and use the hello protocol to set their sending
counters such that the following holds: n
SM!SM
0
= n
SM
0
 SM
+ 1 and n
SM
0
!SM
=
8
nSM SM
0
+ 1. Then, each time SM sends a message to SM
0
, it includes the current
value of its sending counter n
SM!SM
0
in the message, and then increments the counter.
When SM receives a message from SM
0
, it veries if the message contains a counter
value that is greater than its current receiving counter n
SM SM
0
. If so, then it accepts
the message and increases its counter to the received value, otherwise it rejects the
message. SM
0
behaves similarly.
 Fine. Another counter is f
SM;SM
0
, the initial value of which is 0. SM uses this counter
to account for the misbehavior of the terminode that hosts SM
0
with respect to the
terminode that hosts SM . The protocols that are used by the security modules are
such that SM does not immediately increase its bean counter if its hosting terminode
forwarded a packet, but it waits for an acknowledgment from the security module SM
0
of the next hop in order to be sure that the packet has indeed been forwarded. If this
acknowledgement does not arrive, then SM records the misbehavior of the next hop
by increasing the ne counter f
SM;SM
0
associated with SM
0
. The next time it sends a
packet to the same next hop, SM also sends the value of the ne counter. If this packet
is processed by the next hop, then SM
0
takes into account the ne by decreasing its
bean counter accordingly, and SM can reset its ne counter. If, however, this packet
is not processed either (i.e., no acknowledgement arrives), then SM further increases
the ne counter. If the counter exceeds a limit, then the hosting terminode of SM may
stop forwarding packets toward the misbehaving next hop. This mechanism stimulates
terminodes to send acknowledgements.
We should note that a missing acknowledgment does not necessarily mean that the next
hop is misbehaving and did not send it. It is also possible that the hosting terminode of
SM cheated and it did not actually forward the packet or it falsely claims the acknowl-
edgement to be missing. However, we assume that this is not the case, because it would
contradict our assumption about the greediness of the terminode: the terminode can-
not increase its number of beans by not forwarding the packet or claiming an arrived
acknowledgement missing, whereas it can increase its number of beans if it behaves
correctly.
4.2 Implementing the Packet Purse Model
4.2.1 The Packet Purse Header (PPH)
In the Packet Purse Model, each packet has to carry some beans required to forward the
packet. These beans are stored in the Packet Purse Header (PPH), which is an additional
header between the MAC Layer Header and the Network Layer Header as it is illustrated in
Figure 3. The PPH is created and manipulated by security modules. It is cryptographically
protected in order to prevent forgery and illegitimate modication during transit.
The PPH is re-computed by the security module of each forwarding terminode. It has
three parts: a part that is intended for the security module of the next hop, another part
that is an acknowledgement for the security module of the previous hop, and a third one
that is common and intended for both the next and the previous hops. The common part
contains only the unique identier of the security module that computed this PPH. The
acknowledgement part contains the identier of the security module of the previous hop, the
sending counter that was received from that hop, and an Acknowledgement Authentication
Code (AAC) that is computed from the previous PPH, which was attached to the packet,
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Figure 3: The Packet Purse Header (PPH)
using a keyed cryptographic hash function g, where the key is the shared secret between this
security module and the security module of the previous hop. Finally, the purse part that
is intended for the security module of the next hop contains the identier of that security
module, the sending counter associated with that security module, the number of beans in the
packet, a ne to be paid by the next hop, and a Purse Authentication Code (PAC), which is
computed from the purse part of the PPH and the cryptographic hash value h(NetworkPDU)
of the content of the packet using a keyed cryptographic hash function g, where the key is
the shared secret between this security module and the security module of the next hop.
As it can be seen from the description, the acknowledgement that is intended for the
previous hop is piggy backed on the packet that is sent to the next hop. Here, we rely on the
assumption that the terminodes have omnidirectional antennae, and they receive all messages
that are emitted by neighboring terminodes. Thus, when a terminode forwards a packet to
the next hop, the previous hop, from which this packet has arrived, also receives it, and
extracts the acknowledgement.
4.2.2 The packet forwarding protocol
The packet forwarding protocol is illustrated in Figure 4, where we assume that terminode T
q
has received a packet from terminode T
p
(which received it from the previous hop T
o
), and T
q
wants to forward it to T
r
. To do so, T
q
has to obtain a new Packet Purse Header PPH
0
from
its security module SM
q
by supplying it with the identier of the security module of the next
hop, the Packet Purse Header PPH received from the previous hop, and the cryptographic
hash value h(NetworkPDU) of the content of the packet.
SM
q
rst veries PPH. It reads the identier of its sender SM
p
from the common part
of PPH. Then, it veries if the sending counter in PPH is greater than the receiving counter
n
q p
associated with SM
p
. If so, then this PPH is not a replay (i.e., it has not yet been
processed by SM
q
), and SM
q
proceeds by setting n
q p
to the received counter value. SM
q
then veries the authenticity of PPH by re-computing the Purse Authentication Code and
comparing the computed value to the received one. If they match, then it knows that PPH
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Figure 4: The packet forwarding protocol
has indeed been created by SM
p
and has not been modied . Finally, it checks if there is a
ne to be paid, and if so, then it decreases its bean counter accordingly.
After successful verication, SM
q
calculates the new Packet Purse Header PPH
0
. This
is illustrated in Figure 5. It puts its own identier id
SM
q
in the common part. It decreases
the number of beans in the packet by one, and constructs the purse part by including the
identier of the next security module SM
r
, the sending counter n
q!r
associated with SM
r
,
the number of beans in the packet, the ne counter f
q;r
associated with the next hop, and
the Purse Authentication Code PAC
q;r
calculated from the purse and the hash value of the
content of the packet using the cryptographic hash function g and the shared secret k
q;r
.
Then SM
q
increases its sending counter n
q!r
, and constructs the acknowledgement part by
including the identier of SM
p
, the sending counter n
p!q
form the purse part of PPH, and
the Acknowledgement Authentication Code AAC
q;p
, which is calculated from PPH using
the cryptographic hash function g and the shared secret k
q;p
. Finally, SM
q
stores PPH
0
internally, and outputs a copy for T
q
.
T
q
attaches the new Packet Purse Header PPH
0
to the packet and sends it to T
r
. T
p
also
receives the forwarded message, and it can recognize that there is an acknowledgement for
its security module SM
p
in the packet, because PPH
0
contains the identier of SM
p
in the
acknowledgement part. T
p
uploads PPH
0
to its security module. SM
p
tries to nd PPH in
its internal memory by matching the identier of SM
q
and the sending counter received in the
acknowledgement part of PPH
0
to the identiers and sending counters in the purse part of
stored pending Packet Purse Headers. If SM
p
nds PPH, then it veries the authenticity of
the acknowledgement in PPH
0
by re-computing the Acknowledgement Authentication Code
from PPH and comparing it to the value received in PPH
0
. If they are equal, then SM
p
increases its bean counter by one, decreases its ne counter f
p;q
by the the value of the ne
in PPH (but never lets it become less than 0), and deletes PPH from its internal memory.
T
p
keeps track of the forwarded but not yet acknowledged packets. If no acknowledgement
arrives to a packet after a given time, then T
p
noties its security module, which increases the
ne counter that is associated with the misbehaving neighbor and deletes the corresponding
Packet Purse Header from its internal memory. Although it would be simpler if the security
module itself measured the time-out, we do not want to require the security module to have
11
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Figure 5: Re-computing the PPH
an internal clock, because this would also require an internal source of energy, and we believe
that building such a tamper resistant module is quite dicult. Our solution still works well,
because T
p
is not interested in signaling a missing acknowledgement if the acknowledgement
has indeed arrived: it can increase its number of beans by uploading the acknowledgement,
while it cannot gain anything by claiming it missing.
4.2.3 Packet creation and nal delivery
Before the packet is sent by its originator, the security module decreases its bean counter by
the number of beans specied by the originator and creates a PPH that contains the same
number of beans. This PPH is a special one, because it does not have any acknowledgement
part, since there is no previous hop that would need it.
When the packet is delivered to its nal destination, then the PPH is loaded in the
security module, which creates a special PPH' that has only an acknowledgement part. The
destination should send an empty packet with this special PPH' to the previous hop. If it does
not send it, then the security module of the previous hop increases its ne counter associated
with the destination, and the destination will be punished for the misbehavior later.
4.3 Implementing the Packet Trade Model
The Packet Trade Model can be implemented in the same way as the Packet Purse Model.
Like before, each packet has an additional header, which we call Packet Trade Header (PTH).
The structure of the PTH is the same as the structure of the PPH, with the only dierence
that instead of the number of beans, it contains the price of the packet. The same packet
forwarding protocol described before applies in the Packet Trade Model as well with a minor
modication. Now, the security module of each forwarding terminode decreases its bean
counter by the price in the PTH (buying) and increases the price by one when re-computing
the PTH, and increases its bean counter by the new price when the acknowledgement arrives
(selling).
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5 Analysis
In this section, we shortly analyze the implementation of the Packet Purse Model described
above. We show how the implementation solves our original problems of stimulation for co-
operation and prevention of overloading, and discuss its robustness and eciency. Essentially,
this analysis applies for the implementation of the Packet Trade Model as well, since it is
almost identical to the implementation of the Packet Purse Model. We will point out those
cases in which the analysis does not apply for the Packet Trade Model.
5.1 Stimulation for co-operation and prevention of overloading
Our implementation encourages users to keep their terminodes switched on and let them
forward packets, because this is the only way to increase their number of beans. If a terminode
does not forward a packet, then it will receive a ne later, and its number of beans will be
decreased. In addition, if a terminode denies packet forwarding for a long time, then no more
packet will be sent to it.
Our implementation of the Packet Purse Model discourages users to send useless trac
and overload the network because this would decrease their number of beans. Our solution
ensures that the benet each user gets from the network does not exceed what she contributes
to it.
We should note, however, that our implementation of the Packet Trade Model does not
deter users from overloading the network. The reason is that, contrary to the original idea of
the Packet Trade Model, our implementation does not allow a terminode to decide whether
it buys a packet or not. Instead, a terminode is forced to buy each packet that is sent to it.
This means that any terminode can generate useless trac and overload the network without
any consequences. In order to solve this problem, our implementation must be modied to
allow each terminode to decide whether to buy a packet or not. This would provide a sort of
\back pressure" mechanism, which may ensure that eventually nobody will buy packets from
misbehaving senders. This issue is left for further study.
5.2 Robustness
The implementation described above is robust and resists against various attacks. Bean
forgery is prevented, because it would require either an illegitimate increase of the bean
counter, or the generation of fake packet purses or acknowledgements. The former is impossi-
ble, because the bean counter is manipulated by the security module, which functions correctly
and its behavior cannot be altered. The latter is prevented by the use of cryptographic check-
sums (i.e., the Purse Authentication Code and the Acknowledgement Authentication Code),
which can be computed correctly only by the security module. These checksums also protect
the integrity of the PPH during transit. Furthermore, the packet purse cannot be detached
from the packet and re-used with another one, because the calculation of the Purse Authenti-
cation Code involves the cryptographic hash value of the content of the packet. Replay of the
packet purse is prevented by the use of an ever increasing counter that is placed in the purse.
This solution is preferable to the application of time-stamps, because it does not require the
security module to have an internal clock and to run clock synchronization protocols.
The originator of a packet cannot re-use the beans that it has already loaded in the
packet, because the security module decreases the bean counter when creating a PPH for a
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new packet. An intermediary cannot take out more beans from the packet than it deserves for
the packet forwarding, because its bean counter can be manipulated exclusively by its security
module, which behaves correctly. Moreover, the intermediary is stimulated to forward the
packet, because its bean counter will be increased only if an acknowledgment arrives from the
next hop, and this is only possible if the packet has been forwarded.
Our solution requires each hop to send an acknowledgement for the packet it received.
Terminodes, however, may be reluctant to send acknowledgements, because sending consumes
energy and it does not have any direct advantages. This problem is related to fair exchange [6,
7] (in our case, packets for acknowledgements), and it is usually solved with the involvement of
a trusted third party (TTP). We cannot, however, assume the existence of TTPs in terminode
networks. The problem of fair exchange without a TTP is analyzed in [8], where it is called
unenforced safe exchange. The author proves that isolated unenforced safe exchange is not
possible if the last step of the exchange has some costs. A proposed solution is that one should
not consider only a single isolated exchange, but one should also take into account possible
future exchanges, where the behavior of the parties in the future exchanges may depend on
the result of the current exchange. If misbehavior in the present can be punished in the future,
then unenforced safe exchange becomes possible. In our implementation, we used these ideas
in two ways to stimulate terminodes to send acknowledgments. First, we reduced the cost
of sending an acknowledgement by piggy backing it to a normal packet that the terminode
sends anyway (except for the destination of a packet). Second, we introduced nes, in order
to punish misbehaving terminodes. Moreover, the ne is sent in the purse together with the
beans, which enforces the terminode who wants the beans to upload the ne as well to the
security module that will decrease the bean counter according to the received ne.
We should note that exchanges without TTP can never achieve the same level of fairness
as those with TTP. The existence of dierent levels of fairness is discussed in [9], where the
authors relate the dierent levels to dierent equilibrium concepts in game theory. According
to these results, our implementation achieves Nash-equilibrium fairness, which essentially
means that a misbehaving party may cause some damage to a correctly behaving one, but
it also loses something or at least cannot gain anything (apart from malicious joy) with the
misbehavior.
5.3 Eciency
At rst sight, our solution may seem a bit heavy to implement. However, the overhead
generated by it is small when compared to all the functions that are required to accomplish
packet forwarding. In particular, the calculation and verication of the Packet Purse and
the Packet Trade Headers require only cryptographic hash function computations, which can
be done very eciently [10]. Public key cryptographic operations are used only rarely (in
the hello protocol). Moreover, most of the processing load will be supported by the security
module; to some extent, it can be accomplished in parallel with the processing performed by
the main processor of the terminode.
Another issue is the length of the Packet Purse Header. Assuming that the identiers
of the security modules are 8 byte long, the sending and receiving counters are 6 byte long,
the Purse and the Acknowledgement Authentication Codes are 20 byte long, and the beans
and the ne are both represented on 2 bytes, we get that the Packet Purse Header is 80 byte
long. We cannot further assess whether this is acceptable or too much, because of the lack of
information about the length of other headers and the average length of the packets.
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Eciency can be improved by using the Packet Purse Header and all the related mecha-
nisms only in a small fraction of packets. Then the majority of the packets would not carry
an additional header and would be processed without any call to the security module. This
means, however, that the terminodes would not be rewarded for the forwarding of each packet,
and we would have to ensure that they forward those packets as well from which they cannot
expect any beans. This issue is left for future work.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we addressed the problem of service availability in terminode networks (mobile
ad-hoc WANs). We have presented a secure mechanism to stimulate end users to keep their
terminodes turned on, to refrain from overloading the network, and to thwart tampering
aimed at converting the device into a \selsh" one.
This work was motivated by the experience of cellular networks, which has proven that as
soon as mobile stations are under the control of end users, there is a strong temptation to alter
their behavior in one way or another. Therefore, all facets of security have to be carefully
analyzed and implemented. We are currently working on the integration of the proposed
solution with other security functions, such as condentiality and integrity protection of
communications.
Finally, we believe that introducing a kind of virtual currency can serve several other
purposes in mobile ad-hoc WANs. First, it can be used to remunerate not only communication
services, as described in this paper, but also information services. Second, it can be used as a
way to pay for the usage of backbones or satellite links, when a terminode has to communicate
with a very distant party. In this case, the virtual currency will have to be converted in some
way into \hard" currency.
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